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MONSANTO V. GEERTSON FARMS: CONGRESSIONAL
INTENT, JUDICIAL INFIDELITY, AND THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
ALEXANDER MACDONALD*
INTRODUCTION
In April 2010, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Monsanto
Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,1 a challenge by organic alfalfa growers to the
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s (“APHIS”) decision to dereg-
ulate a particular variety of genetically engineered alfalfa.2 Among other
things, the growers argued that APHIS’s deregulation decision was invalid
for failure to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”).3
The growers alleged that the agency failed to conduct an Environmental
Impact Statement (“EIS”), which NEPA requires for most major federal
agency actions.4 They alleged that the agency improperly found that its
deregulation decision would have “No Significant Impact.”5
By a vote of 7–1,6 the Supreme Court ruled against the organic and
traditional growers. In the wake of the decision, the Court’s explication
of the proper standard for granting preliminary injunctive/equitable relief
has drawn the most attention from commentators.7 Less noted, but perhaps
just as important, was the Court’s interpretation of NEPA. Specifically, the
Court interpreted NEPA so as to implicitly expand the “zone of interests”
protected under the EIS requirement.8 Prior to Monsanto, it appeared clear
that the sole purpose of the EIS requirement was to prevent avoidable
* B.A. Old Dominion University, 2009. J.D. William & Mary Law School, 2012. Law Clerk
to the Senior Judges, District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 2012-13. 
1 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010).
2 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2743.
3 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2750–51. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2006).
4 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2750.
5 Id. at 2750–51.
6 Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Breyer took no part in the decision.
Id. at 2748.
7 See, e.g., Anthony Disarro, Freeze Frame: The Supreme Court’s Reaffirmation of the
Substantive Principles of Preliminary Injunctions, 47 GON. L. REV. 51, 84 (2011); Nate
Hausman, Note, Monsanto Co. v. Geerston Seed Farms: Breathing a Sigh of Equitable
Relief, 25 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 155, 180–203 (2011).
8 See Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2755–56.
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environmental harms. Yet as Monsanto interpreted NEPA, the EIS re-
quirement also protects the interest of plaintiffs who assert purely econom-
ic injuries.9 Under Monsanto, plaintiffs with no environmental interests
whatsoever will be able to challenge agency decisions regarding the exe-
cution of an EIS.10
This Note argues that the Court’s interpretation of NEPA runs
counter to Congressional intent in ways that could ultimately undermine
NEPA’s efficacy. Congress designed the EIS requirement to increase in-
tragovernmental focus on the potential environmental effects of proposed
federal action.11 By expanding the base of plaintiffs eligible to challenge
agency EIS decisions to those asserting only economic or commercial in-
juries, the Court “risk[ed] that the outcome could, even assuming tech-
nical fidelity to law, in fact thwart the congressional goal.”12 NEPA is
unambiguous in its aim: the prevention of unnecessary environmental
harms. The Court risks doing violence to this purpose by authorizing
plaintiffs to use NEPA as a shield from economic competition.
Part I of this Note provides some historical and legal context for
the Monsanto decision. Part I.A reviews the history and policy goals of
NEPA and the EIS requirement. Part I.B tracks the Court’s approach to
the “zone of interests” test and its application to NEPA. Part I.C examines
the factual and procedural history leading up to Monsanto. Part I.D looks
more closely at the decision itself. More precisely, Part I.D examines the
standing aspect of the Court’s decision, as applied to NEPA.
Part II of this Note argues that the Court’s ruling has broader
implications for judicial application of NEPA, the EIS requirement, and
future federal agency action. Part II.A argues that despite Justice Alito’s
aversions to the contrary, his majority opinion clearly expanded the base
of plaintiffs eligible to challenge agency EIS decisions. Part II.B argues
that Monsanto runs counter to Congressional intent. Congress never in-
tended for NEPA to act as a statutory shield to commercial competition.
Rather, Congress intended only to prevent unnecessary environmental
harm. By expanding the statute beyond its intended scope, the Court risks
doing violence to NEPA’s ultimate purpose. Finally, Part II.C argues that
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332; Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Def. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 370–
74 (1989).
12 See Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA (“HWTC II ”), 861 F.2d 277, 283 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (noting that “judicial intervention may defeat statutory goals if it proceeds at
the behest of interests that coincide only accidentally with those goals”).
2012] MONSANTO V. GEERTSON FARMS 321
the Court missed an opportunity to clarify its own confused standing
doctrine regarding environmental injuries. In a prior opinion, Justice
Breyer outlined an alternative approach to environmental injury: the
“realistic threat” test.13 Had the Monsanto Court taken Justice Breyer’s
approach, it could have adequately protected environmental interests, lim-
ited the ability of economic competitors to bring suit under NEPA, and
clarified the Court’s standing doctrine. This Note argues that the Monsanto
Court missed an opportunity to adopt the “realistic threat” test.
I. NEPA, STANDING, AND THE MONSANTO DECISION
A. An Overview of the National Environmental Policy Act
and the Environmental Impact Statement Requirement
The National Environmental Policy Act went into effect in 1970.14
Its enactment was the product of growing Congressional concern during
the 1960s over national environmental deterioration.15 The statute’s au-
thors stated its goals in sweeping terms, declaring it the policy of the
United States,
[T]o use all practicable means and measures, including fi-
nancial and technical assistance, in a manner calculated
to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and
maintain conditions under which man and nature can ex-
ist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic,
and other requirements of present and future generations
of Americans.16
The legislative history of NEPA reflects its drafters’ concern with
mitigating environmental damage. Principally, they were concerned with
the effects of economic development and the indifference of federal agen-
cies to these effects.17 Their concern is evidenced by a report the House
13 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 501–10 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
14 Pub. L. No. 91-190 § 2 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006)).
15 William L. Andreen, In Pursuit of NEPA’s Promise: The Role of Executive Oversight in
the Implementation of Environmental Policy, 64 IND. L.J. 205, 212 (1989).
16 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
17 Andreen, supra note 15, at 205. See also Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, No. C 06-
01075 CRB, 1, 19 (N. D. Cal., 2007) (mem.), rev’d sub nom. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson
Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology
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Subcommittee on Science and Aeronautics published prior to NEPA’s
passage. In that report, the subcommittee detailed the danger that un-
restrained pursuit of economic development posed to the environment.18
The subcommittee report found that “[our] well intentioned but poorly in-
formed society is haphazardly deploying a powerful, accelerating technol-
ogy in a complex and somewhat fragile environment. The consequences
are only vaguely discernible.”19 The subcommittee report concluded that
one way to mitigate these consequences was to require federal agencies
to collect additional scientific data before undertaking major projects.20
NEPA pursues its goals through certain procedural requirements;
principally the Environmental Impact Statement requirement.21 The EIS
requirement reflects Congress’s concern with ensuring that agencies act
with complete and accurate information.22 The statute requires federal
agencies to prepare an EIS for “every recommendation or report on pro-
posals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment.”23 Specifically, NEPA
provides that:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest ex-
tent possible . . . (2) all agencies of the Federal Government
shall . . . (C) include in every recommendation [for] . . .
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the hu-
man environment, a detailed statement by the responsible
official on—(i) the environmental impact of the proposed
action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which can-
not be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii)
alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship
between local short-term uses of man’s environment and
/downloads/alfalfa/gealfalfa_Feb07_courtdecision.pdf (“NEPA is our basic national char-
ter for protection of the environment. NEPA emphasizes the importance of coherent and
comprehensive up-front environmental analysis to ensure informed decision making to
the end that the agency will not act on incomplete information, only to regret its decision
after it is too late to correct.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
18 Andreen, supra note 15, at 212 (citing SUBCOMM. ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND DEV. TO
THE HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., MANAGING THE
ENV’T. 1–3 (1968)).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
22 See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989).
23 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
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the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productiv-
ity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments
of resources which would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented.24
The EIS thus serves as the mechanism through which Congress
ensures that agencies consider and report the expected environmental
impacts of their actions before moving forward.25 Specifically, the agen-
cy must explain the “purpose and need for a proposed action, describe[ ]
the affected environment, identif[y] and examine[ ] alternatives . . .
[and] analyze[ ] the environmental impacts and consequences of each
alternative . . . .”26 The agency must also consider “appropriate mitiga-
tion measures.”27
The EIS is a purely procedural requirement. That is, it requires
the agency to fully consider the impact of its proposed action, but does
not mandate any particular substantive outcome.28 In the words of one
observer, NEPA simply “inject[s] environmental concerns into the calcu-
lus of federal decisionmaking.”29 Thus, when reviewing the actions of fed-
eral agencies, courts must strike a balance between enforcing NEPA’s
procedural mandates while avoiding undue interference with the agency’s
substantive decisions.30
However, to say that the EIS requirement is “procedural” is not
to denigrate the critical role it plays in implementing Congress’s sweep-
ing environmental goals. Rather, the EIS requirement is arguably the
“linchpin” of NEPA’s statutory structure.31 The EIS requirement ensures
that federal agencies carefully examine the environmental impacts of
24 Id.
25 See id.
26 Kenneth J. Warren, Judicial Review Under NEPA: A Look at Two Recent Decisions,
THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 1 (Jul. 15, 2010), http://www.hangley.com/ufiles/judicial
-review-under-nepa-eprint.pdf?phpMyAdmin=322c4d6299c6t40879e47&phpMyAdmin
=YWw3mr2zITNeJsyIpdcoIwbjDu6.
27 Id.
28 Id.; see also Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 371 (1989) (“NEPA does
not work by mandating that agencies achieve particular substantive environmental re-
sults. Rather, NEPA promotes its sweeping commitment to prevent or eliminate damage
to the environment and biosphere by focusing Government and public attention on the envi-
ronmental effects of proposed agency action.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
29 Andreen, supra note 15, at 206.
30 Warren, supra note 26, at 1.
31 Andreen, supra note 15, at 207.
324 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 37:319
their actions.32 An EIS serves as evidence that the agency has taken a
“hard look” at those impacts.33 In this way, the EIS requirement ensures
that “the ambitious goals of NEPA do not wither at the hands of adminis-
trative hostility or passivity.”34
B. A Review of Article III Standing Doctrine and the “Zone of
Interests” Requirement
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the federal
judiciary’s function by requiring an actual “case or controversy” as a
predicate to the exercise of judicial power.35 The U.S. Supreme Court has
derived its standing doctrine from this “case or controversy” require-
ment.36 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,37 the Court explained that
standing doctrine requires would-be plaintiffs to show (1) injury-in-fact,
(2) causation, and (3) redressability.38 These requirements are constitu-
tionally founded and non-waivable.39 Congress cannot abrogate Article
III standing requirements.40
In addition to Article III’s requirements, the Supreme Court has
developed certain “prudential” requirements.41 Prudential requirements
are not constitutionally based, and so are subject to Congressional
32 See id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 U.S. CONST. art. III § 2 cl. 1.
36 E.g., Ass’n Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970) (noting
that “the question of standing in the federal courts is to be considered in the framework
of Article III which restricts judicial power to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies’”).
37 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
38 Id. at 560 (“Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitu-
tional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered
an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ . . . Second,
there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the
injury has to be ‘fairly . . . traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . .
the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court.’ Third, it
must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by
a favorable decision.’”) (internal citations and brackets omitted).
39 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 63 (3d. ed. 2006).
40 Id.
41 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154 (describing prudential requirements as “rule[s] of self-
restraint”).
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abrogation.42 Among these requirements is the “zone of interests” require-
ment. Also referred to as “statutory standing,”43 the “zone of interests”
test is, at bottom, a method by which courts limit the scope of a statute
to fit Congressional intent.44 In other words,
Congress often fails to specify who may and who may not
invoke the power of the courts to enforce the terms of a
statute. It follows that the judiciary has to supply a prin-
ciple by which to infer Congress’s intent on that often crit-
ical question. The zone of interests test is the result.45
The Supreme Court has applied the “zone of interests” test liberally
while remaining focused on effecting Congressional intent. In Association
of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, the Court explained
that the question under the zone of interests test is “whether the interest
sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute.”46 This is not a partic-
ularly demanding requirement,47 as the facts of Data Processing indicate.
That case involved the question of who had standing to sue under the
Bank Service Corporation Act (“BSCA”).48 In broad terms, BSCA prohib-
its banks from engaging in certain non-banking activities.49 The petition-
ers were a group of data processing services. They sought standing to
challenge a decision by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
which permitted national banks to provide data processing services.50
The Court found that the petitioners had standing.51 Reading the statute
liberally, the Court found that Congress “arguably” intended to protect
42 Id. (“Congress can, of course, resolve the question one way or another, save as the re-
quirements of Article III dictate otherwise.”).
43 See generally Radha A. Pathak, Statutory Standing and the Tyranny of Labels, 62 OKLA.
L. REV. 89 (2009).
44 Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. Thomas, 885 F.2d 918, 921–22 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(citing Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 400 (1987)).
45 Id. at 921–22.
46 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153.
47 See Greer v. Ill. Hous. Dev. Auth., 524 N.E.2d 561, 574 (Ill. 1988) (citing CHARLES KOCH,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 10.9, 170 (1985) (arguing that the zone of interests
test has proven to be a “feeble barrier to standing.”)).
48 See generally Data Processing, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). See also 12 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1867
(2006).
49 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 155.
50 Id. at 151.
51 Id. at 158.
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competitors’ interests under the statute.52 This was enough to pass the
zone of interests test.53
Similarly, in Clarke v. Securities Industry Association, the Court
explained that it would deny standing under the “zone of interests” test
only when “the plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or incon-
sistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot be reason-
ably assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.”54 The Court
held that Congress need not express a specific intent to benefit a particu-
lar future plaintiff.55 Rather, the crucial element is what interest the
plaintiff seeks to vindicate.56
This is not to say that the “zone of interests” test is completely
toothless. The Court has refused standing to plaintiffs when it is clear
Congress did not intend to protect their interests under a particular
statute. For instance, in Air Courier Conference of America v. American
Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO,57 the respondent union challenged the
Postal Service’s decision to suspend its statutory monopoly over certain
52 Id. at 156. It is important to note that Data Processing does not stand for the proposition
that the Court will generally allow plaintiffs with solely economic interests to vindicate
non-economic statutes. The Data Processing Court read the Bank Service Corporation Act
as encompassing Congress’s concern with certain competitive and economic interests. The
Court favorably quoted the First Circuit’s rationale, finding that
[s]ection 4 had a broader purpose than regulating only the service cor-
porations. It was also a response to the fears expressed by a few senators,
that without such a prohibition, the bill would have enabled “banks to
engage in a nonbanking activity,” and thus constitute “a serious excep-
tion to the accepted public policy which strictly limits banks to banking.”
We think Congress has provided the sufficient statutory aid to standing
even though the competition may not be the precise kind Congress leg-
islated against.
Id. at 155 (citing Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 408 F.2d 1147, 1153 (1st Cir. 1969)) (internal
citations omitted). More to the point, the Court has subsequently interpreted Data Process-
ing as being premised on the fact that Congress “arguably legislated against [competitive
injury] by limiting the activities available to national banks.” Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n,
479 U.S. 388, 397 (1987) (comparing Data Processing to Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617
(1971)). Data Processing also has limited precedential value in cases not involving chal-
lenges under Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The Court has noted
that Data Processing involved a challenge under the APA, and that “what comes within the
zone of interests of a statute for purposes of obtaining judicial review of administrative
action under the generous review provisions of the APA may not do so for other purposes.”
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
53 Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 156.
54 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987).
55 Id. at 399–400.
56 See id. at 399.
57 498 U.S. 517 (1991).
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postal routes and allow private couriers to deliver letters to foreign postal
services.58 The Court held that the union’s interest in preserving the jobs
of its members was not within the “zone of interests” protected by the
relevant statute.59 The Court reasoned that Congress was concerned with
maintaining sufficient revenue for the Post Office, not with postal workers’
job security.60 Likewise, in Block v. Community Nutrition Institute,61 the
Court held that consumers had no standing to challenge the Department
of Agriculture’s issuance of “milk market orders.”62 It held that allowing
consumers to challenge the orders would disrupt Congress’s carefully
constructed statutory scheme.63 These decisions demonstrate the Court’s
willingness to deny standing where Congress clearly did not intend to
protect a would-be plaintiffs’ interests.
The appropriate inquiry under the “zone of interests” test is a
narrow one. In Bennett v. Spear, the Court held that whether a plaintiff’s
interest falls within those “arguably protected” by a statute is determined
not by reference to the purpose of the statute as a whole, “but by reference
to the particular provision of law upon which the plaintiff relies.”64 Thus,
it is not the overarching Congressional motivation driving the enactment
of a statute that is relevant. Rather, only the purpose of the particular pro-
vision the plaintiff is suing under is relevant.65
As the foregoing cases should make clear, the scope of the “zone
of interests” test is defined by Congressional intent. Following from this
conclusion, courts must make a two-step inquiry when applying the test.66
First, courts must determine what the prospective plaintiff’s interests are.67
Second, courts must determine “whether Congress arguably intended to
protect those interests” under the particular statutory provision the plain-
tiff alleges has been violated.68 If the plaintiff’s interests do not fall within
58 Id. at 519–20.
59 Id. at 530.
60 Id. at 518.
61 467 U.S. 340 (1984).
62 Id. at 345–53.
63 Id. at 345–48.
64 520 U.S. 154, 175–76 (1997).
65 Id. at 176 (“[T]he plaintiff must establish that the injury he complains of . . . falls within
the ‘zone of interests’ sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms
the legal basis for his complaint.”) (emphasis in original) (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990)).
66 Michael J. Ritter, Standing in the Way of Animal Welfare: A Reconsideration of the Zone-
of-Interest “Gloss” on the Administrative Procedures Act, 29 REV. LITIG. 950, 970–71 (2010).
67 Id. (citing Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970)).
68 Id. at 971 (citing Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153).
328 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 37:319
the scope of Congressional intent, courts should refuse to find the plain-
tiff has standing.69
C. A Review of the Background and Procedural History
Leading to Monsanto
The dispute in Monsanto centered around “Roundup Ready Alfalfa”
(“RRA”), a genetically altered breed of alfalfa designed to resist pesticides.70
Specifically, RRA’s designers engineered it to be glyphosate-tolerant by
inserting synthetic genes into the alfalfa genome.71 Glyphosate is an ac-
tive ingredient in Roundup pesticide.72 Petitioner Monsanto Corp. owned
the intellectual property rights to RRA.73 Monsanto licensed RRA to co-
petitioner Forage Genetics International (“FGI”).74 FGI was the exclusive
developer of RRA seed.75
The Plant Protection Act (“PPA”)76 tasks the Secretary of Agricul-
ture with developing and promulgating regulations to “prevent the intro-
duction of plant pests into the United States or the dissemination of plant
pests within the United States.”77 The secretary delegated this authority
to APHIS.78 Acting pursuant to that authority, APHIS promulgated rules
governing the introduction of genetically engineered plant products.79
The rules presume that genetically modified plants are “plant pests”
until APHIS determines otherwise.80 Such “plant pests” are subject to
69 See id.
70 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2750 (2010).
71 ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, GLYPHOSATE TOLERANT (ROUNDUP
READY) ALFALFA DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 1 (2009), available at http://
www.aphis.usda.gov/publications/biotechnology/content/printable_version/fs_alfalfa.pdf.
72 Id.
73 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. 2750.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 7 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7786 (2006).
77 § 7711(a).
78 7 C.F.R. §§ 2.22(a), 2.80(a) (2010).
79 See §§ 340.0–340.9.
80 § 340.1(a) (defining “plant pests” to include “any processed, manufactured, or other
products of plants” and “regulated article” as “[a]ny organism which has been altered or
produced through genetic engineering, if the donor organism, recipient organism, or
vector or vector agent belongs to any genera or taxa designated in § 340.2 and meets the
definition of plant pest . . . or any other organism or product altered or produced through
genetic engineering which the Administrator determines is a plant pest or has reason to
believe is a plant pest . . . .”).
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APHIS’s regulations.81 The regulations permit any person to file a peti-
tion for deregulation with APHIS on the ground that a particular regu-
lated product does not pose a plant pest risk.82
As a genetically engineered plant product, RRA fell within the
scope of APHIS’s regulations.83 In 2004, petitioners Monsanto and FGI
sought deregulated status for RRA.84 In response to petitioners’ request,
APHIS prepared a preliminary Environmental Assessment (“EA”) to ex-
amine the environmental impact of deregulating RRA.85 The agency pub-
lished its draft EA in the federal register and solicited public comment.86
The agency received 663 public comments, 520 of which opposed deregu-
lation.87 Among the most prevalent concerns commenters expressed was
the possibility that RRA could cross-pollinate with organic and tradition-
ally grown alfalfa, contaminating non-RRA crops.88 Cross-pollination can
occur at ranges of up to two miles.89 Organic farmers complained that be-
cause of the cross-pollination risk, “they [would] no longer be able to market
their products as ‘organic,’ or at least as non–genetically engineered.”90
They also argued that deregulation would harm the alfalfa export market.91
Roughly seventy-five percent of the United States’ alfalfa exports go to
Japan.92 Because Japan does not permit the importation of glyphosate-
tolerant alfalfa, the farmers’ access to the export market would have been
severely restricted.93 The commenters also raised concerns that wide-
spread use of RRA would lead to the development of glyphosate-tolerant
weeds and to the increased use of Roundup pesticide overall.94
Despite these negative comments, APHIS approved Monsanto’s de-
regulation petition.95 As a result, the petitioners were to be able to market
81 See § 340.0(a)(2) at n.1.
82 7 C.F.R. § 340.6.
83 Monsanto v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2750–51 (2010).
84 Id.
85 USDA/APHIS, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT
(2005).
86 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2750.
87 Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, No. C 06-01075 CRB, at 3 (N. D. Cal. 2007) (mem.), rev’d
sub nom. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010), available at http://
www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/downloads/alfalfa/gealfalfa_Feb07_courtdecision.pdf.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Johanns, No. C 06-01075 CRB, at 3.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
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and sell RRA without conforming to APHIS’s regulations.96 The agency
issued a contemporaneous finding of “no significant impact.”97 The agen-
cy acknowledged that once it deregulated RRA, users of the genetically
engineered seeds would not be subject to regulatory “isolation distance”
requirements.98 That is, users of RRA would not be required to grow their
genetically engineered crops more than two miles from any non-RRA field.99
The agency nevertheless concluded that the risk of cross-pollination was
not significant.100 It determined that organic and traditional farmers bore
the burden of “develop[ing] and maintain[ing] an organic production sys-
tem plan that outlines the steps [they] will take to avoid cross pollination
from neighboring operations.”101 The agency also concluded that it was
unlikely that cross-pollination would occur to an extent that would sig-
nificantly harm exports to Japan.102 The agency concluded that organic
and traditional alfalfa farmers would not be significantly impacted by its
decision because: “(1) non–genetically engineered alfalfa will likely still
be sold and available to those who wish to plant it; and (2) farmers pur-
chasing seed will know what they are purchasing because the seed will be
labeled as glyphosate tolerant.”103 Finally, the agency agreed with the com-
menters that the development of glyphosate-tolerant weeds was likely.104
However, it did not view this development as significant, because the same
thing happens with every widely used herbicide.105
The respondents in Monsanto were a mix of traditional alfalfa
growers and public interest groups concerned with food safety. They filed
suit to challenge APHIS’s decision to deregulate RRA. Most relevant to this
Note, the respondents challenged the agency’s decision to forego an EIS.106
The respondents alleged several potentially significant environmental im-
pacts. These included “biological contamination” of non-RRA alfalfa crops,107
96 Id.
97 Johanns, No. C 06-01075 CRB, at 3.
98 Id. at 3–4.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 4 (quoting APHIS’s administrative record).
102 Johanns, No. C 06-01075 CRB, at 4.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Johanns, No. C 06-01075 CRB, at 4–5. Petitioners also alleged violations of the Endan-
gered Species Act and the PPA. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743,
2751 (2010).
107 Johanns, No. C 06-01075 CRB at 7. “Biological contamination” occurs when genetically
engineered plants cross-pollinate with non–genetically engineered plants, mixing engi-
neered seed with non-engineered seed. Id.
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the development of glyphosate-tolerant weeds,108 and environmental dam-
age resulting from an increased use in glyphosate.109 The respondents “did
not seek preliminary injunctive relief.”110 As a result, over 3000 farmers
planted RRA while the respondents’ claims proceeded in federal court.111
The Federal District Court of the Northern District of California
granted injunctive relief to the respondents. Based on Ninth Circuit pre-
cedent, the district court held that “an EIS must be prepared if ‘substan-
tial questions are raised as to whether a project may cause significant
degradation of some human environmental factor.’”112 The court ex-
plained that the respondents did not have to show that the alleged
potential environmental harm would in fact occur if the agency failed to
complete an EIS.113 Rather, the respondents only had to raise a “substan-
tial question” as to whether the proposed action would have a significant
effect on the environment.114
Importantly, the district court found that the plaintiffs had stand-
ing to assert a challenge to the agency’s failure to complete an EIS.115 The
agency argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the nature of
their injury was economic.116 The agency relied on the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Ashley Creek Phosphate v. Norton,117 which held that “purely
financial” interests did not fall within the “zone of interests” protected un-
der NEPA.118 The district court distinguished Ashley Creek on the ground
that the alfalfa plaintiffs’ injury was not “purely financial.”119 Rather,
their “potential economic injury [arose] directly from the environmental
impact of APHIS’s decision to deregulate Roundup Ready Alfalfa.”120 The
108 Id. at 3. Deregulation of RRA would facilitate the increased use of Roundup pesticide. Id.
109 Id. at 7–8.
110 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2751.
111 Id.
112 Johanns, No. C 06-01075 CRB, at 6 (citing Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d
1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original)).
113 Id. (citing Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th
Cir. 1998)).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 17.
116 Id.
117 420 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2005).
118 Id. at 940 (“The bottom line is that Ashley Creek’s interest in the EIS analysis is purely
financial. NEPA, on the other hand, is directed at environmental concerns, not at business
interests. For reasons closely related to its lack of a concrete injury, Ashley Creek’s chal-
lenge does not fall within NEPA’s zone of interests . . . . [W]e hold that Ashley Creek
lacks standing under the prudential standing requirement.”).
119 Id.
120 Johanns, No. C 06-01075 CRB, at 17.
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district court enjoined all planting of RRA pending APHIS’s completion of
an EIS.121 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.122 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on January 15, 2010.123
D. A Review of the Monsanto Decision
The Supreme Court handed down its opinion on June 21, 2010.
Justice Alito authored the majority opinion. Both parties challenged the
other party’s standing in the case. The Court addressed those challenges
in turn.
Justice Alito began by addressing the respondents’ argument. The
respondents contended that even if the Supreme Court ordered the dis-
trict court to lift its injunction, the district court would have to remand
the matter to the agency to prepare an Environmental Assessment.124
They argued that the petitioners failed to show the agency would rule in
favor of deregulation on remand.125 Therefore, their asserted injury was
“speculative” and not “imminent.”126 Justice Alito disagreed, noting that
the petitioners had a petition for partial deregulation pending before the
agency, awaiting its decision on an EIS.127 There was no doubt that grant-
ing this petition would redress the respondents’ asserted injuries.128 He
found “more than a strong likelihood” that the agency would approve the
respondents’ deregulation petition if the district court were to lift the
injunction.129 He therefore rejected the respondents’ argument that the
injunction did not cause the petitioners actual or imminent harm.130
Justice Alito then addressed the petitioners’ argument that the
respondents did not have standing to challenge APHIS’s deregulation
decision. The respondents asserted several injuries, including the risk of
gene contamination.131 At least one respondent asserted that his alfalfa
farm was in a prominent seed-growing region.132 He alleged that he faced
121 Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 541 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 2008).
122 Id. at 948.
123 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 1133 (2010) (granting petition for
certiorari).
124 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2753 (2010).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 2754.
128 Id.
129 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2754.
130 Id. at 2753–54.
131 Id. at 2754–55.
132 Id. at 2754–55 n.3.
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a significant risk that his crops would be contaminated by the RRA
strain.133 Justice Alito noted that this and other statements in the dis-
trict court record indicated a “significant risk of contamination to respon-
dents’ crops.”134
However, Justice Alito did not find injury-in-fact based on the risk
of cross-pollination and gene contamination. Rather, he focused on the
injuries the respondents would suffer “even if their crops are not actually
infected with the Roundup ready gene.”135 Specifically, Justice Alito
looked to the steps the respondents would have to take to minimize the
likelihood of contamination.136 APHIS’s decision to deregulate RRA would
cause the respondents to incur “increased cost[s] of alfalfa breeding due to
potential for genetic contamination,” including “contracting with growers
outside of the United States to ensure that [they could] supply genetically
pure, conventional alfalfa seed.”137 In Justice Alito’s view, these increased
costs, i.e., economic harms, were sufficient to establish constitutional
injury-in-fact.138
Justice Alito rejected the petitioners’ contention that this eco-
nomic injury did not fall within the “zone of interests” protected under
NEPA. The petitioners contended that the respondents’ “commercial”
interests were “not . . . interest[s] that NEPA was enacted to address.”139
Justice Alito rejected this argument summarily, writing that,
That argument is unpersuasive because, as the District
Court found, respondents’ injury has an environmental as
well as an economic component. In its ruling on the merits
of respondents’ NEPA claim, the District Court held that
the risk that the RRA gene conferring glyphosate resis-
tance will infect conventional and organic alfalfa is a sig-
nificant environmental effect within the meaning of NEPA.
133 Id. (quoting the district court record) (“Since alfalfa is pollinated by honey, bumble and
leafcutter bees, the genetic contamination of the Roundup Ready seed will rapidly spread
through the seed growing regions. Bees have a range of at least two to ten miles, and the
alfalfa seed farms are much more concentrated.”).
134 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2754–55 n.3.
135 Id. at 2755.
136 Id.
137 Id. (citing Declaration of Phillip Geertson in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment at 3, Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns (N.D. Cal 2007) (No. 306CV01075), 2006
WL 5820363).
138 Id. at 2756.
139 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2755–56 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162–63 (1997)).
334 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 37:319
Petitioners did not appeal that part of the court’s ruling,
and we have no occasion to revisit it here.140
Justice Alito noted that the district court determined that the risk
of gene contamination was a “significant environmental concern for pur-
poses of NEPA.”141 The respondents sought the very same injunctive relief
before the Supreme Court as they had in district court.142 Justice Alito
wrote that “[t]he mere fact that respondents also seek to avoid certain
economic harms that are tied to the risk of gene flow does not strip them
of prudential standing.”143
In sum, Justice Alito found that the respondents had constitu-
tional standing to challenge APHIS’s decision based on injuries they were
sure to suffer even if cross-pollination did not occur. These injuries were
commercial in nature. Justice Alito then tried to dodge the question of
whether such commercial injuries could satisfy the “zone of interests”
test under NEPA. He relied on the district court’s finding of a significant
environmental impact based on the risk of cross-pollination and increased
pesticide use.144 He wrote that these findings showed the respondents’
claim had an “environmental component.”145
II. MONSANTO’S IMPLICATIONS FOR STANDING UNDER NEPA
AND A BETTER WAY FORWARD
Part I of this Note reviewed the purposes of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act. In passing NEPA, Congress was primarily concerned
with mitigating environmental damage caused by federal action. Part I
also reviewed the Supreme Court’s approach to the “zone of interests”
prudential standing requirement. Part I then examined the procedural
and factual backdrop of the Supreme Court’s Monsanto decision and
Justice Alito’s approach to the “zone of interests” under NEPA.
Part II makes the case that Justice Alito implicitly expanded the
zone of interests under NEPA to include purely economic and commercial
interests. Part II argues that this expansion is out of step with Congres-
sional intent. Justice Alito’s approach in Monsanto eschews the Court’s
prior adherence to Congressional intent in favor of a more flexible, less
140 Id. at 2756 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Monsanto, 130 S. Ct. at 2756.
145 Id.
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principled approach. This more flexible approach is likely to have signi-
ficant collateral consequences. By permitting plaintiffs to litigate pure
commercial and economic issues under NEPA, the Court expanded the
statute’s coverage beyond its original purpose. In doing so, Justice Alito
increased the risk that litigants will put NEPA to use for purposes other
than environmental protection. Part II contends that it is so far unclear
whether Monsanto will make it easier for those with legitimate environ-
mental interests to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. What is clear
is that the decision expands litigation under NEPA in a way not congru-
ous with Congress’s intent. Finally, Part II argues that the Monsanto
Court missed a prime opportunity to clarify its own confused standing
doctrine in environmental harm cases.
A. Monsanto Expands the Zone of Interests under NEPA
to Embrace Plaintiffs Who Would Use the Statute as
a Commercial/Economic Shield
While Justice Alito’s majority opinion takes pains to avoid explic-
itly recognizing economic or competitive injury as sufficient grounds to
satisfy the “zone of interests” requirement under NEPA, that is inargu-
ably his result. Justice Alito alluded to the possibility that the petitioners
could establish Article III standing by alleging an environmental injury.146
However, he did not actually find that they established such an injury.
He did not even find that such an injury was cognizable under the facts of
the case as pled in their complaint. Rather, he found injury-in-fact based
on the petitioners’ alleged economic and competitive injuries.147
Given this threshold finding, Justice Alito’s subsequent discussion
of the “zone of interests” requirement is unconvincing. Justice Alito wrote
that petitioners satisfied the “zone of interests” test because the “respon-
dents’ injury has an environmental as well as an economic component.”148
However, given that Justice Alito did not recognize the petitioners’ envi-
ronmental injuries in his “injury-in-fact” discussion, this “environmental
component” could not have been a factor in his “zone of interests” analysis.
The petitioners could not satisfy the “zone of interests” test with an injury
they did not effectively plead or prove. They could not proceed to satisfy
the “zone of interests” test with an injury that was insufficient to satisfy
the injury-in-fact requirement. Justice Alito must therefore have based
146 Id. at 2754–55 n.3.
147 Id. at 2756.
148 Id.
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his resolution of the “zone of interests” test on the respondents’ alleged
economic and competitive injuries.149
In seeing why this must be the case, it is helpful to understand
the alternative approaches available to Justice Alito. First, he could have
found that the petitioners established Article III and NEPA injuries
based on their alleged environmental injuries. This would have had the
effect of granting the respondents constitutional standing while respect-
ing NEPA’s purely environmental character.150 On the other hand, this
option would arguably have expanded the scope of Article III standing.
Finding a sufficiently concrete environmental injury based on the peti-
tioners’ allegations would arguably have been inconsistent with some of
the Court’s standing precedent in environmental cases.151 There is some
indication that at least one of the other Justices, Justice Scalia,152 was
149 Some commentators have argued that the Court recognized a “hybrid” environmental
and commercial injury, which allowed the petitioners to overcome both Article III’s injury-
in-fact requirement and the “zone of interest” requirement. For instance, Prof. Mank has
argued that, “Because the Monsanto respondents had legitimate environmental concerns,
they had the right to prudential standing under the zone of interests test even if they also
had economic motivations as well.” Bradford Mank, Standing in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson
Seed Farms: Using Economic Injury as a Basis for Standing When Environmental Harm
Is Difficult to Prove, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 307, 336 (2010). He argues that the district court’s
finding of significant environmental harm foreclosed any attempt to compare the case with
HWTC II. In that case, the D.C. Circuit denied standing to a trade association based on its
alleged competitive injuries. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA (“HWTC II ”),
861 F.2d 277, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1988). However, Prof. Mank’s argument overlooks the fact
that Justice Alito’s opinion never adopted the district court’s findings regarding environ-
mental harm. Rather, as detailed in Part I.D, the Court based its finding of Article III
injury solely on the petitioners’ alleged economic injury.
150 Andreen, supra note 15, at 205–06 (noting Congress’s overriding environmental pur-
pose in enacting NEPA) (“NEPA represented an unprecedented attempt to protect the
human environment by broadly injecting environmental concerns into the calculus of
federal decisionmaking.”).
151 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[T]he plaintiff must
have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”)
(internal citations omitted); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154–56 (1990); Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 125 (1983) (denying standing for failure to establish a sufficiently
“concrete” injury); Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493–501 (2009) (holding
that the plaintiffs failed to establish a sufficiently “imminent” injury when they failed to
show the specific times and places that the government’s policy would cause them harm).
See also Mank, supra note 149 (noting criticism of Justice Scalia for allegedly requiring
greater proof of injury in environmental cases).
152 Mank, supra note 149, at 328, 330 (arguing that “[i]t is fair to read the oral argument
transcript as indicating that Justice Scalia was not convinced that the respondents-
plaintiffs had demonstrated an actual injury necessary for standing” and “the overall tone
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hostile toward such an expansion of Article III standing.153 While the lan-
guage of Justice Alito’s majority opinion indicates he does not share that
hostility,154 he may have been hesitant to stray from his fellow Justice’s
stance on the issue.155 Indeed, he may have been concerned that doing so
would cost him Justice Scalia’s influential vote.156
Justice Alito’s second option was to dismiss the case for lack of con-
stitutional standing. Doctrinally, this option may have been the easiest
option available. On the other hand, the use of standing doctrine to avoid
addressing a case on the merits has been the subject of criticism from com-
mentators157 and members of the Court.158 An overly restrictive approach
toward standing may have the effect of denying plaintiffs with legitimate
injuries and meritorious claims the benefit of judicial redress.159 A strict
approach to standing also seems antiquated and out of step with modern
pleading practices.160 Much of the Court’s modern standing jurisprudence
displays an awareness of these issues and an inclination toward liberalized
of his questions and remarks about standing suggest that he was, at a minimum, skepti-
cal of the respondents-plaintiffs’ standing argument, or that he had tentatively concluded
that their standing argument was likely to fail.”).
153 Id. at 329 (noting that Justice Scalia indicated during oral argument that he did not
believe the plaintiffs established that cross-contamination would occur and that the peti-
tioners’ statistical evidence did not prove “how many unwilling farmers are going to have
infected fields.”) (internal quotations omitted). Justice Scalia also indicated during oral argu-
ments that he was “sure” the market would respond to the threat of cross-pollination by pro-
ducing companies that “advertise: [w]e only cut natural seed fields,” thereby expressing his
skepticism that the plaintiffs could establish injury-in-fact based on cross-pollination. Id.
154 See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2754–55 (2010) (noting with
apparent sympathy to the respondents’ claims that “[a] substantial risk of gene flow injures
respondents in several ways.”).
155 Mank, supra note 149, at 330 (arguing that Justice Alito’s “somewhat convoluted analy-
sis may have been designed to win the vote of Justice Scalia, who . . . was not convinced
that the respondents-plaintiffs could show an actual injury from the activities of the peti-
tioners in selling RRA that is then planted by numerous alfalfa farmers.”).
156 Id.
157 E.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 62.
158 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 593 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(objecting to what he viewed as the majority’s overly formalistic approach to standing
requirements).
159 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 62 (arguing that “standing requirements might be
quite unfair if they prevent people with serious injuries from securing judicial redress.”).
160 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 593 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“I fear the Court’s demand for detailed
descriptions of future conduct will do little to weed out those who are genuinely harmed
from those who are not. More likely, it will resurrect a code-pleading formalism in federal
court summary judgment practice, as federal courts, newly doubting their jurisdiction,
will demand more and more particularized showings of future harm.”).
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standing requirements.161 Justice Alito no doubt was aware of these issues.
His decision not to deny standing may also indicate his concern with set-
ting overly restrictive precedent in the field of Article III standing.
Finally, Justice Alito had the option of finessing his rationale to
recognize the petitioners’ more “concrete” economic injuries to satisfy
Article III’s injury requirement, while ostensibly preserving NEPA’s en-
vironmental integrity by citing the district court’s finding of “significant
environmental injury” in his “zone of interests” analysis. This was the
avenue Justice Alito chose to pursue.162 In doing so, he was able to coa-
lesce a majority of Justices, some of whom had been on opposite sides in
previous environmental standing cases.163 The result of this approach was
largely unsatisfying and potentially damaging. Justice Alito’s attempt to
navigate this middle path effectively opened the door to plaintiffs alleg-
ing purely economic or competitive injuries to bring actions under NEPA.
The ultimate impact of Justice Alito’s chosen path is admittedly
difficult to forecast. Some commentators have suggested that Monsanto
makes it easier for environmental plaintiffs to overcome traditional
Article III standing hurdles by pleading an ancillary economic or com-
mercial injury.164 Others have argued that Monsanto will make it easier
for plaintiffs to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement based on a risk of
environmental injury, so long as that risk will cause them to incur eco-
nomic expenditures.165 Whether or not these predictions prove accurate
161 See, e.g., Mass. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 522–23 (2007) (holding that
Massachusetts had standing to challenge the Environmental Protection Agency’s decision
not to regulate greenhouse gases based on the injury global warming would cause to the
state’s coastlines); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19–26 (1998) (holding that
the petitioners had standing to challenge the FEC’s decision not to require the disclosure
of certain information from certain Political Action Committees under the Federal Election
Campaign Act).
162 See supra Part I.D.
163 Mank, supra note 149, at 338 (“In Monsanto, Justice Alito wrote an opinion that joined
together Justices that had often disagreed in the past regarding environmental standing
cases. For example, Justice Ginsburg, the author of Laidlaw and a dissenting Justice in
Summers, joined Justices Scalia and Thomas, who both dissented in Laidlaw and were
in the majority in Summers.”) (internal citations omitted).
164 See Mank, supra note 149, at 336 (“A plaintiff or petitioner that has both economic and
environmental injuries may have an easier time establishing standing than a litigant
who only has one or the other interest.”).
165 Lisa A. Cutts, What’s the Big Deal? The Letdown That Is the Landmark Monsanto v.
Geertson Case, 20 S.J. AGRIC. L. REV. 117, 139 (2011) (“The court’s statement opens the
door to plaintiffs who are neither harmed, nor imminently to be harmed, but subject to
some, as yet undefined, level of risk of harm where they incur some cost to mitigate or
identify the risk.”).
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will be determined in future cases. That inquiry is beyond the scope of
this Note.
Assuming for the sake of argument that Monsanto did loosen
Article III’s standing requirements, that says nothing about the deci-
sion’s effect on NEPA. Properly understood, Monsanto is a double-edged
sword. Even if the decision lowers the hurdles environmental plaintiffs
must overcome to satisfy Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement, it also
lowers the hurdles economic plaintiffs face in overcoming the “zone of
interests” test. As a result, NEPA is no longer limited to plaintiffs seek-
ing to vindicate Congress’s environmental goals. Indeed, in the Court’s
words, “[t]he mere fact that respondents also seek to avoid certain eco-
nomic harms that are tied to the risk of gene flow does not strip them of
prudential standing.”166
B. Monsanto’s Expansion of the “Zone of Interests” Under NEPA
Was Contrary to Congressional Intent
There are several significant objections to loosening the “zone of
interests” test under NEPA to embrace economic plaintiffs. First and
foremost is that such an expansion is contrary to Congressional intent.167
The “zone of interests” test is, at bottom, a method of assuring judicial fidel-
ity to Congressional intent.168 By venturing too far from Congress’s goals,
courts risk frustrating the statute’s purpose and overstepping their role.169
A good illustration of this concern is the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s decision in HWTC II.170 In
that case, the court of appeals dealt with the issue of competitor standing
and the “zone of interests” test. An industry group had challenged an
EPA rule171 regulating “hazardous” used oil pursuant to its authority
166 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2756 (2010).
167 See Andreen, supra note 15, at 205–06.
168 Cement Kiln Recycling Coal. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 255 F.3d 855, 870 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(“Under this ‘zone of interests’ test, the ‘essential inquiry is whether Congress intended
for a particular class of plaintiffs to be relied upon to challenge agency disregard of the
law.’”) (quoting Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987)); Hazardous
Waste Treatment Council v. Thomas, 885 F.2d 918, 921–22 (1989) (“Congress often fails
to specify who may and who may not invoke the power of the courts to enforce the terms
of a statute. It follows that the judiciary has to supply a principle by which to infer
Congress’s intent on that often critical question. The zone of interests test is the result.”).
169 Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA (“HWTC II ”), 861 F.2d 277, 283–84 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
170 Id.
171 50 Fed. Reg. 49, 164 (1985) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 261, 264–66, 271).
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under the Used Oil Recycling Act of 1980 (“UORA”) and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (“RCRA”).172 The industry group
represented several manufacturers of hazardous treatment equipment.173
The thrust of the group’s complaint was that the final rule was not “com-
prehensive and strict enough” to comply with UORA and RCRA’s statutory
mandate.174 The group asserted three types of claims: consumer claims,175
competitor claims,176 and claims of supply diminution.177 Addressing the
“apparent anomaly of regulated entities demanding stricter regulation,”
the court of appeals held that the group had standing to challenge the rule
insofar as its members would suffer environmental injuries.178 The court
found that the group’s “consumer” claims alleged environmental injuries,
and thus were entitled to standing, despite their “commercial” nature.179
However, the court denied the challenger standing insofar as its mem-
bers would suffer “competitive losses” as a result of the regulation.180 The
court interpreted the Supreme Court’s holding in Clarke to require “less
than a showing of congressional intent to benefit but more than a mar-
ginal relationship to the statutory purposes.”181 The court found no
congressional intent to benefit the manufacturers of hazardous waste
treatment equipment.182 The court explained the danger involved in
172 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921–6939a (2011).
173 HWTC II, 861 F.2d at 280.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 281. The challenger alleged that one of its members, BVER Environmental, would
suffer damage to its storage tanks from the receipt of contaminated oil.
176 Id. at 281. Three group members alleged that the rule would damage the market for
their high-tech control services.
177 Id. at 281. Some group members alleged that the EPA’s lax regulations would cause
their supply of oil to be directed elsewhere.
178 HWTC II, 861 F.2d at 280.
179 Id. at 282. The court compared the alleged consumer injuries to the injury suffered by
a hypothetical lake owner who licenses the lake’s use to fisherman and boaters. Id. The
court held that this sort of environmental injury was cognizable, regardless of the lake
owner’s commercial interest in preventing the pollution. “That the injury is commercial is
no obstacle. ‘Sneering at commercial gains by adding “mere” to them does not make them
go away.’” Id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 838 F.2d
229, 233 (7th Cir. 1988)) (brackets omitted).
180 HWTC II, 861 F.2d at 285.
181 Id. at 283 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
182 Id. The group argued that Congress’s clear intent to promote the proper disposal and re-
cycling of hazardous waste brought the group’s interests into line with Congressional intent.
Id. at 283. The court rejected this argument, reasoning that the fact that Congress intended
to ensure proper disposal did not imply that it meant to protect the manufacturers of dis-
posal equipment. “Whenever Congress pursues some goal, it is inevitable that firms ca-
pable of advancing that goal may benefit . . . . But in the absence of either some explicit
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granting standing to plaintiffs asserting claims outside the zone of pro-
tected interests:
It is worth remembering that judicial intervention may
defeat statutory goals if it proceeds at the behest of inter-
ests that coincide only accidentally with those goals. . . .
When we grant standing to a party with only an oblique
relation to the statutory goal, we run the risk that the out-
come could, even assuming technical fidelity to law, in fact
thwart the congressional goal. Further, of course, techni-
cal fidelity to law cannot be assumed; judges err.183
The court of appeals recognized that when courts allow plaintiffs
to assert interests outside the protected zone, they allow plaintiffs to
pursue goals that may not result in the furtherance of Congress’s pur-
pose. For instance, the court speculated that tighter regulations could
conceivably improve the group’s members’ profits while actually harming
the environment.184
The HWTC II court distinguished its facts from those in Clarke
and Data Processing. In those cases, the Supreme Court allowed compet-
itors to vindicate statutory interests despite the absence of any clear
congressional intent to protect their interests.185 The HWTC II court
reasoned that in those cases, the Supreme Court found that the persons
whom Congress explicitly protected made “relatively unsuitable plain-
tiffs.”186 In the case before it, the court of appeals saw no reason why
plaintiffs suffering actual environmental injuries could not bring suit to
enforce the relevant statutes.187
The D.C. Circuit’s rationale in HWTC II is useful for analyzing
the Supreme Court’s Monsanto decision in two ways. First, the concerns
evidence of an intent to benefit such firms, or some reason to believe that such firms would
be unusually suitable champions of Congress’s ultimate goals, no one would suppose them
to have standing to attack regulatory laxity.” Id. at 283.
183 Id. at 283–84.
184 HWTC II, 861 F.2d at 284.
185 See id.
186 Id. (“For example, it is hard to picture a person or firm that could assert injury in the
form of ‘the dangers of possible loss of public confidence in banks and the danger to the
economy as a whole of speculation fueled by bank loans for investment purposes.’”) (quoting
Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 397 n.13 (1987)).
187 Id. at 284 (“As the consumers of the environmental purity afforded by RCRA seem highly
suitable champions of enforcement, and we find no clue of congressional intent to rely on
other champions, we find [Data Processing and Clarke] inapplicable.”).
342 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 37:319
the D.C. Circuit expressed about fidelity to congressional intent apply
with equal force to the facts of Monsanto. Just as commercial injuries
fell outside the protected “zone of interests” under UORA and RCRA in
HWTC II, the Monsanto respondents’ commercial injuries fell outside the
protected “zone of interests” under NEPA. As previously discussed,188
Congress’s purpose in enacting NEPA was to minimize the environmen-
tal impacts of federal action.189 Congress did not manifest any intent to
protect the competitors of regulated entities.
It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which the interests of
competitors would not align with NEPA’s environmental purposes. The
facts of Monsanto provide a good example. A decision to deregulate “plant
pests” will not always pose environmental risks. Where the plant pest
itself poses no environmental threat, such as where contagion or cross-
pollination would be unlikely, deregulating the pest without conducting
an EIS would pose no environmental threat. Allowing competitors to
challenge deregulation in such a scenario would benefit competitors’
bottom lines while failing to vindicate NEPA’s environmental purpose.
The plaintiffs’ interests would align only “accidentally” with NEPA’s
goals, just as the HWTC II plaintiff’s goals only accidentally aligned with
UORA and RCRA’s goals.190
Second, like the scenario in HWTC II, the facts in Monsanto are
distinguishable from those in Data Processing. Unlike the consumers
Congress sought to protect with BSCA, there is no apparent reason that
individuals who suffer environmental injuries under NEPA would make
particularly unsuitable plaintiffs. For example, the district court found
that the Monsanto petitioners suffered environmental injuries.191 If the
petitioners were suitable plaintiffs to assert their commercial injuries,
they were surely also suitable plaintiffs to assert their environmental
injuries. The respondents’ situation demonstrates that those who suffer
commercial or competitive injuries have no advantage as effective plain-
tiffs over those who suffer environmental injuries, as they can be the exact
same entities. Both the petitioners’ economic and environmental injuries
stemmed from the exact same threat: the risk of cross-pollination. Thus,
there is no reason to make an exception under NEPA allowing competitors
188 See supra Part I.A.
189 Id.
190 See HWTC II, 861 F.2d at 283–84.
191 Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, No. C 06-01075 CRB, at 19 (N. D. Cal., 2007)
(mem.), rev’d sub nom. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010),
available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/downloads/alfalfa/gealfalfa_Feb07
_courtdecision.pdf.
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to bring suit as stand-ins for those suffering injuries within the statute’s
protected zone. Environmental plaintiffs are perfectly capable of asserting
their own injuries under NEPA.
C. The Monsanto Court Missed an Opportunity to Clarify Its
Confused Environmental Injury Standing Doctrine
The Supreme Court did not have to make a choice between ex-
panding NEPA’s “zone of interests” and denying the respondents consti-
tutional standing. There was another option available to the Court. The
Court could have applied a version of the “realistic threat” test Justice
Breyer proposed in his Summers v. Earth Island Institute dissent.192 By
adopting this test, the Court could have recognized the respondents’ en-
vironmental injuries as sufficient to satisfy Article III’s injury-in-fact
requirement, despite the difficult issues of proof the case presented.193
This approach would have relieved Justice Alito of the need to engage in
theoretical gymnastics to justify his conclusion in his “zone of interests”
discussion. The Court could have recognized the respondents’ environ-
mental harms as Article III injuries, and such environmental injuries
clearly fall within NEPA’s zone of protection.
The “realistic threat” test is not a novel concept. In Summers, the
Court denied standing to several environmental groups challenging a
United States Forest Service rule194 exempting small fire remediation
projects from impact statement requirements.195 Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion appeared to reject the use of statistical probabilities to establish
injury-in-fact.196 In dissent, Justice Breyer proposed a “realistic threat”
test for determining injury-in-fact.197 Justice Breyer wrote that he would
grant an environmental organization Article III standing whenever it
could establish a “realistic threat” that one of its members would be
harmed in the near future by the defendant’s action.198 Justice Breyer de-
emphasized the Court’s requirement that an asserted injury be “immi-
nent,” focusing instead on ensuring that the asserted injury was not
“hypothetical” or “conjectural.”199 He wrote that “a threat of future harm
192 555 U.S. 488, 501–10 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
193 Mank, supra note 149, at 309 (noting that during oral arguments, Justice Scalia was
skeptical that the petitioners could prove they would suffer from cross pollination).
194 36 C.F.R. § 215.4(a).
195 555 U.S. 488, 494–97 (2009).
196 Id. at 497–98.
197 Id. at 505 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
198 Id. at 509–10 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
199 Id. at 505–06 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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may be realistic even where the plaintiff cannot specify precise times,
dates, and GPS coordinates.”200 Rather, the “realistic threat” standard re-
quires no more proof than the term “realistic” suggests.201
Applying the “realistic threat” test in Monsanto would have solved
the respondents’ Article III standing problem. The district court recog-
nized that the respondents established a significant likelihood of cross-
pollination.202 APHIS admitted that after deregulation, it would have been
unable to impose isolation distances on RRA growers.203 The court also
found a significant likelihood in the increased use of Roundup pesticide.204
These harms were surely “realistic,” in that they were not “hypothetical”
or “conjectural.” The respondents had proven them to the satisfaction of
the district court. By applying the “realistic threat” test, Justice Alito could
have found the respondents had Article III standing without resorting to
their economic/commercial injuries.
In addition, by adopting the “realistic threat” test, the Court could
have brought coherence to its standing doctrine regarding environmental
injuries. As it stands, the Court’s doctrine is somewhat confused. This con-
fusion is a product of the apparent discrepancy between Summers and the
Court’s decision in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw.205 In Laidlaw, a plaintiff
group established injury-in-fact by proving they held “reasonable concerns”
about future health injuries resulting from pollution.206 These concerns
caused them to forego recreational activities.207 The Court recognized these
concerns as sufficiently concrete to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement.208
However, Summers refused to recognize a statistical probability of harm
as a sufficiently concrete injury.209 Despite the apparent inconsistency
between the holdings, Summers did not overrule Laidlaw.210 The dis-
crepancy has left the requirements to establish standing in significant
200 Summers, 555 U.S. at 506 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
201 Id. at 505 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
202 Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, No. C 06-01075 CRB, at 3 (N. D. Cal., 2007)
(mem.), rev’d sub nom. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010),
available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotechnology/downloads/alfalfa/gealfalfa_Feb07
_courtdecision.pdf.
203 Id. at 8.
204 Id. at 15–16.
205 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
206 Id. at 181–83.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497–98 (2009).
210 Bradford Mank, Summers v. Earth Island Institute Rejects Probabilistic Standing, But
a “Realistic Threat” of Harm Is a Better Standing Test, 40 ENVTL. L. 89, 91–92 (2010).
2012] MONSANTO V. GEERTSON FARMS 345
doubt.211 By expressly adopting the test, Justice Alito could have clarified
what is a confused area of the Court’s jurisprudence.212
CONCLUSION
Monsanto is a frustrating case. In his majority opinion, Justice
Alito found that a group of organic and traditional alfalfa growers had
standing to challenge APHIS’s decision to deregulate RRA. In doing so,
Justice Alito may have lowered the hurdles environmental plaintiffs face
in overcoming Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement. Whether or not
this will prove to be true will be borne out in future cases. What is less
speculative is the decision’s impact on the “zone of interests” protected
under NEPA. Monsanto undoubtedly extends NEPA’s protection to plain-
tiffs vindicating purely economic/commercial interests. Justice Alito’s
aversions to the contrary are terse and frustratingly inadequate.
More frustrating is that Monsanto’s extension of NEPA’s protection
is clearly unwarranted by Congressional intent. Congress’s unambiguous
concern in enacting NEPA was to mitigate unnecessary environmental
impacts.213 It did not intend to erect a shield for the economic/commercial
competitors of regulated entities. Monsanto is also inconsistent with the
Court’s own precedent. Prior to Monsanto, the Court uniformly applied
the “zone of interests” test in accord with congressional intent.214 Justice
Alito’s majority opinion does not even recognize this departure, let alone
attempt to rationalize it.
Perhaps most frustrating of all, the Court missed an excellent
opportunity to clarify its confused standing doctrine in environmental
injury cases. The Court could have resolved the problems Monsanto pre-
sented by explicitly adopting the “realistic threat” test. This test was not
a new concept. Justice Breyer fully explicated the test in Laidlaw. The
Court’s failure to reach out and seize this opportunity leaves its standing
doctrine frustratingly adrift.
211 Id. at 92 (noting that “[t]he Summers decision’s blanket rejection of probabilistic standing
is in considerable tension with Laidlaw’s reasonable concerns test, which Summers did
not question”).
212 Prof. Mank has suggested that the “realistic threat” test is superior to both the Summers
and Laidlaw approaches. Id. at 93 (“The realistic threat test . . . offers a better approach
to standing than either Summers’s unrealistic demand that plaintiffs precisely predict
the future or Laidlaw’s focus on whether a plaintiff avoided recreational activities rather
than whether the defendant’s activities caused actual harm.”).
213 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006).
214 See supra Part II.B.
